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Filosofiska Notiser
Årgång 2, Nr 3, December 2015
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Daniel Rönnedal
Alethic-Deontic Logic:
Deontic Accessibility Defined in Terms of Alethic Accessibility
Abstract
According to many normative theories, to say that something ought
to be, or ought to be done, is to state that the being or doing
of this thing is in some sense a necessary condition (requirement)
of something else. In this paper, I explore the consequences of
such a view. I consider what kind of alethic-deontic logic is appropriate
for theories of this sort. Alethic-deontic logic is a kind of bimodal
logic that combines ordinary alethic (modal) logic and deontic logic.
Ordinary alethic logic is a branch of logic that deals with modal
concepts, such as necessity and possibility, modal sentences, arguments
and systems. Deontic logic is the logic of norms. It deals with
normative words, such as "ought", "right" and "wrong", normative
sentences, arguments and systems. I will define the so-called deontic
accessibility relation in terms of the so-called alethic accessibility
relation, and I will examine the consequences of this definition.
It will turn out that a particular alethic-deontic system, Strong
alethic-deontic logic, is plausible given this definition. By
adding a certain frame-condition, the accessibility condition,
we obtain a slightly stronger system, Full alethic-deontic logic.
Some of the technical details of these systems are briefly described.
Most of the systems mentioned in this paper are developed in more
detail elsewhere.
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Daniel Rönnedal
Alethic-Deontic Logic and the Alethic-Deontic Octagon
Abstract
This paper will introduce and explore a set of alethic-deontic
systems. Alethic-deontic logic is a form of logic that combines
ordinary (alethic) modal logic, which deals with modal concepts
such as necessity, possibility and impossibility, and deontic
logic, which investigates normative expressions such as "ought",
"right" and "wrong". I describe all the systems axiomatically.
I say something about their properties and prove some theorems
in and about them. We will be especially interested in how the
different deontic and modal concepts are related to each other
in various systems. We will map these relationships in an alethic-deontic
octagon, a figure similar to the classical so-called square of
opposition.
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Daniel Rönnedal
Allmänna Normer och Strukturen hos Normativa System:
En Logisk Analys
Abstrakt
Den här uppsatsen handlar om allmänna eller generella
eller universella normer och strukturen hos normativa
system. Allmänna normer är normer som uttalar sig om alla
entiteter eller individer eller fenomen av ett visst slag. Men
vilken logisk form har de? Kan de användas för att härleda andra
generella normer och normer som handlar om enskilda individer?
Det tycks förekomma åtminstone två olika typer av föreskrifter
av denna typ: normer där vi kvantifierar över handlingar
eller beteenden och normer där vi kvantifierar över personer,
människor eller levande eller medvetna varelser.
I den här uppsatsen undersöker jag den logiska formen hos dessa.
Jag koncentrerar mig på den senare typen och visar hur det är
naturligt att använda en kvantifierad deontisk logik för att symbolisera
föreskrifter av detta slag och förstå deras logiska form. Jag
beskriver hur det är möjligt att använda allmänna normer för att
härleda andra allmänna eller partikulära normer och hur man med
hjälp av en eller flera allmänna föreskrifter kan bygga upp ett
helt normativt system.
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John F. Peterson
Quine and Plato's Beard Revisited
Abstract
To the extent that it allows individuating properties, Quine's
answer to the puzzle of saying that Pegasus is not without assuming
that Pegasus is is problematic. Alternatively, one might identify
the referent of 'Pegasus' in 'Pegasus is not' with an unactualized
possible. Yet, Quine's own objection that this compromises reductio
proof seems to be decisive. So it seems that the best answer is
Russell's. Unlike Quine's, it shuns individuating properties with
all their attendant difficulties. Unlike Strawson's, it covers
the prima facie truth of saying that Pegasus does not exist. And
unlike Meinong's, it does both without recourse to non-existent
particulars.
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William Simkulet
On the Signpost Principle of Alternate Possibilities: Why Contemporary
Frankfurt-Style Cases are Irrelevant to the Free Will Debate
Abstract
This article contends that recent attempts to construct Frankfurt-style
cases (FSCs) are irrelevant to the debate over free will. The
principle of alternate possibilities (PAP) states that moral responsibility
requires indeterminism, or multiple possible futures. Frankfurt's
original case purported to demonstrate PAP false by showing an
agent can be blameworthy despite not having the ability to choose
otherwise; however he admits the agent can come to that choice
freely or by force, and thus has alternate possibilities. Neo-FSCs
attempt to show that alternate possibilities are irrelevant to
explaining an agent's moral responsibility, but a successful Neo-FSC
would be consistent with the truth of PAP, and thus is silent
on the big metaphysical issues at the center of the free will
debate.
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