Filosofiska Notiser Aktuellt Nummer

FILOSOFISKA NOTISER

Aktuellt nummer

För skribenter

Filosofiska Notiser Årgång 13, Nr 1, 2026

More papers will (perhaps) be added to this issue later.

Andrés Garcia
Worthless Value Makers and the Nature of Instrumental Value

Abstract
This paper asks whether the necessary means to something valuable must themselves possess value. It focuses on value makers—the factors that explain why things are good or bad—and offers two reasons to doubt that they must be value bearers. The first points to a potential regress problem: if every value must have a value maker and every value maker must be valuable, this leads to an infinite chain that contradicts plausible first-order views. The second reason is less technical and draws on examples where seemingly worthless factors appear to generate value. Finally, the paper considers how traditional understandings of instrumental value are challenged once we deny that value makers must be valuable themselves.

Tero Tulenheimo & Giuseppina Ronzitti
Very Small Electorates and the Question of the Instrumental Value of Democracy

Abstract
The democratic decision-making method determines a collective decision on the basis of individual votes of all adult citizens, each vote having the same weight. Jason Brennan (2016) argues that the decisions of individual voters in state-level elections tend to be epistemically defective (avoidance of serious knowledge-acquisition, biased reasoning) and maintains that voters are rational in not doing anything about it, since reducing one’s epistemic defects would not augment the chances of one’s vote becoming decisive. Yet, incompetently made collective decisions can hardly provide a good means for attaining the outcomes that citizens desire. Democracy appears to fail as an instrument.
We ask whether the problems that Brennan identifies occur even in small municipalities. We argue for a negative answer, making use of insights gained through interviews conducted in municipalities with 300 to 500 inhabitants situated in the Åland Islands. Here, a single vote can be decisive. When voting, the inhabitants wish to delegate municipality-political responsibility to someone they trust. They do not reason in terms of society-level outcomes; due to limited resources, the elected representatives even could not undertake any large-scale initiatives. There is very little electoral competition, but inhabitants can contribute to decision-making in many ways. There prevails a balance between democratic participation and informed decision-making. The equilibrium could easily break down: smaller population size would lead to dysfunctionality, augmenting the size might affect negatively the trust between decision-makers and inhabitants, and increased resources could lead to decisions the inhabitants could not control.

Filosofiska Notiser Årgång 12, Nr 2, 2025

Tero Tulenheimo
Johannes Rudbeckius’s Arguments against the Eternity of the World

Abstract
In two interdependent dissertations published in 1611 and 1621, the Swedish theologian and bishop Johannes Rudbeckius (1581–1646) takes up the question of whether the world is eternal. He formulates a number of alternative philosophical arguments in order to justify a negative answer. Without noticing this, he employs two mutually independent notions of eternity. I comment on five of Rudbeckius’s arguments from a systematic point of view. The arguments make use of explicit reasoning about infinite cardinalities, including the use of explicit assumptions regarding arithmetic operations applied to infinite quantities. It is observed that each argument has its origin in medieval scholastic philosophy or is adapted from texts written by Roman authors. The affinity of Rudbeckius’s approach to the scholastic tradition gets highlighted: he is convinced that reason and revelation are not mutually exclusive sources of knowledge: certain theologically relevant propositions can even be proven by philosophical arguments.

John O'Reilly
Embracing Overdetermination

Abstract
Nonreductive physicalism appears to be an attractive package in the philosophy of mind. Mental properties stand in a dependence relation to the physical world but remain irreducible to physical phenomena. Hence, mental phenomena enjoy an autonomy, both ontological and causal, over and above the physical. However, Jaegwon’s Kim’s Causal Exclusion argument questions the stability of this ‘attractive’ view, the outcome of which is that nonreductive physicalism is left with two unattractive options – either epiphenomenalism or, barring overdetermination, reductionism. Some non reductive physicalists, in response, claim that overdetermination is not so unattractive after all. Mental causation, the claim goes, might be a case of genuine or systematic overdetermination. In the following, I claim that such moves consistently mis-characterise the claims of nonreductive physicalism by underplaying the ontological commitments central to nonreductive physical ism. In pressing the significance of these ontological commitments, I show that the nonreductive physicalist appeal to overdetermination is not a viable option. Finally, I consider some contemporary metaphysicians’ appeal to grounding as a more stable version of nonreductive physicalism. However, physical ground ing offers us a picture of the relation between the mental and the physical that does no more than undermine the central features of nonreductive physicalism.

Dani Alnashi
When the future is open: On God’s knowledge and credences in future contingents

Abstract
This paper aims to discuss the problem of divine omniscience and human free will. The problem states that if God is omniscient and knows what every human will do in any given situation, does that not imply that humans do not have free will? If God, for instance, knows that Diana will do P next Tuesday, but Diana refrains from doing P next Tuesday, then Diana will bring about that God did not know that Diana will refrain from doing P next Tuesday and hence, God is not omniscient. But if God is omniscient, Diana cannot refrain from doing P next Tuesday, but if she cannot, then does that not mean that she does not have free will? In this paper, I discuss how open theism, a modern view of God, solves the conflict between divine omniscience and human free will. I also argue that if open theism is correct and the future is open, then God has credences in propositions about the future, which addresses some challenges that open theism usually faces.

Arianna Laura Savelli
Epistemological Limits and Quantum Realities: A Kantian Analysis of QBism and Relationalism

Abstract
This article explores the relationship between Kantian epistemology and QBism, a modern interpretation of quantum mechanics. QBism reconceives scientific objects not as independent entities but as phenomena synthesized through the observer’s active role. It emphasizes the interdependence of knowledge and observation, rejecting the notion of a pre-existent, absolute reality. Much like Immanuel Kant’s assertion that the thing-in-itself lies outside human cognition, QBism denies ontological status to the unobservable or unexperienced, grounding objectivity in intersubjectivity: the shared cognitive structures of human agents. Within this Critical framework, I address an objection raised by Carlo Rovelli, who critiques QBism for anchoring reality to the observer, claiming it risks falling into idealism by positioning the subject outside nature. Rovelli defends a relational view, situating the observer within the world as describable by the same physical laws that apply to all objects. In response, I argue that the QBist observer represents a universal human subject, not a single determinate agent and that intersubjective agreement ensures objectivity without collapsing into solipsism.

Carlo Rovelli
A response to “Epistemological Limits and Quantum Realities: A Kantian Analysis of QBism and Relationalism” by Arianna Laura Savelli

Abstract
This short paper is a response to "Epistemological Limits and Quantum Realities: A Kantian Analysis of QBism and Relationalism" by Arianna Laura Savelli (see above).

Filosofiska Notiser Årgång 12, Nr 1, 2025

More papers will (perhaps) be added to this issue later.

Richmond Campbell
The Evolution of Moral Knowledge

Abstract
That moral knowledge is objective has been relentlessly debunked by reference to the bio-cultural evolution of human morality by natural selection. Building on Darwin’s fundamental insight that morality is grounded in animal sociality, I offer reasons to reject the traditional human-centered conception of morality and argue that the evolution of moral knowledge by natural selection predates humans and the core elements of moral knowledge are in a relevant sense objective.

Jon Williamson
Explanationist constraints on rational degrees of belief

Abstract
In this paper I counter Alexander Bird’s claim that Bayesian probabilities ought to be informed by explanatory considerations. Bird (2022) invokes an argument of Michael Huemer to conclude that inductive inference requires explanatory constraints on prior probabilities. I suggest that this argument is unsuccessful, on account of its appeal to David Lewis’ Principal Principle. Bird goes on to interpret the probabilities in Bayes’ theorem other than the prior as a measure of how well a hypothesis explains the evidence. I show that this interpretation faces a new version of the old evidence problem.

Noah Lemos
Giving Common Sense its Due

Abstract
The common sense tradition in philosophy holds that we have a great deal of common sense knowledge, that there are many ordinary truisms that almost everyone knows, and that this knowledge should have a great deal of weight in philosophy. Such knowledge provides a check on philosophical speculation. In this paper, I have two main aims. First, I contrast the common sense tradition in philosophy with two other philosophical approaches, a Wittgensteinian approach and the Method of Wide Reflective Equilibrium. Second, I respond to criticisms of the common sense tradition which claim that the appeal to common sense belief and knowledge is unphilosophical, useless in philosophical debate, or unable to positively support philosophical theses. These critics of the common sense tradition are not radical skeptics, but I will argue their views do not give common sense knowledge sufficient weight and do not adequately recognize its importance in philosophical inquiry.

Monika Ardelt
Is AI Wise?

Abstract
The answer to the question whether generative artificial intelligence (AI) is wise depends on the definition of wisdom. An analysis of ‘interviews’ with three generative AI programs about their general and personal wisdom demonstrated that AI might be considered wise if wisdom is defined as general wisdom-related knowledge and insight about life or wise reasoning and advice-giving. However, if wisdom is conceptualized as a developmental process toward a wiser personality and self-transcendence, then AI is not wise, because it is neither a person nor has a self. Yet, AI might help people to grow wiser by offering wisdom-related knowledge and wise advice that enable individuals to manage their emotions, view a situation or problem from different perspectives, and reduce their self-centeredness to develop sympathy and compassion for others.

Scott Aikin
Deep Disagreement, the Owl of Minerva Problem, and Pathologies of Meta-Argumentation

Abstract
This essay is an overview of the Owl of Minerva Problem – that our conceptions of argumentation and the practice of reason-giving, when looped into our practices and reason-giving as new arguments about our arguments (meta-arguments), can not only improve our performances but also warp them. Call these negative loops of reflection on argument pathologies of meta-argumentation. Exemplary of this phenomenon is the fallacy fallacy. Proposed solutions to the Owl of Minerva Problem from David Godden (2022) and Andrew Aberdein (2022) are addressed, and the problem is then shown to have application in how we conceptualize deep disagreement. Pathological meta-arguments about deep disagreements are termed deep disagreement fallacies. These meta-argumentative pathologies obtain only for particular conceptions of deep disagreement, but they are not seen to problematize the dialectical depth conception of deep disagreement, which accounts for depth in terms of the variety of inferences and the embeddedness of the commitments constituting the controversy. This is a pragmatic reason to prefer the dialectical depth conception of deep disagreement.

Catherine Z. Elgin
Understanding: The One in the Many

Abstract
Building on my True Enough (2017), I argue that understanding is both one and many. It is one in that, regardless of field or subject matter, genuine understanding satisfies the same generic requirements. It is many in that choices are integral to the satisfaction of those requirements, and within limits multiple divergent choices may be acceptable. It may seem obvious that understanding black body radiation is different from understanding voting patterns in a democracy. My point is that there are multiple ways of understanding topics like black body radiation and voting patterns. To make my case, I discuss scientific, ethical, and aesthetic understanding.

Michał Klincewicz, Mark Alfano, Amir Ebrahimi Fard
Slopaganda: The interaction between propaganda and generative AI

Abstract
At least since Francis Bacon, the slogan “knowledge is power” has been used to capture the relationship between decision-making at a group level and information. We know that being able to shape the informational environment for a group is a way to shape their decisions; it is essentially a way to make decisions for them. This paper focuses on strategies that are intentionally, by design, impactful on the decision-making capacities of groups, effectively shaping their ability to take advantage of information in their environment. Among these, the best known are political rhetoric, propaganda, and misinformation. The phenomenon this paper brings out from these is a relatively new strategy, which we call slopaganda. According to The Guardian, News Corp Australia is currently churning out 3000 “local” generative AI (GAI) stories each week. In the coming years, such “generative AI slop” will present multiple knowledge-related (epistemic) challenges. We draw on contemporary research in cognitive science and artificial intelligence to diagnose the problem of slopaganda, describe some recent troubling cases, then suggest several interventions that may help to counter slopaganda.

Alla Choifer
Understanding Introspection

Abstract
Introspection is a crucial tool for understanding consciousness and the workings of the human mind, but despite its central role, a consensus on the nature of introspection remains elusive. This paper aims to offer a coherent understanding of introspection. It argues for the existence of two distinct levels of introspection rooted in different ways of being self-related. At the primary, non-reflective level of introspection, I am acquainted with my mental states, such as maintaining my balance. Conversely, the reflective level of introspection permits me to contemplate holding my balance and say, for example, ‘I feel dizzy’. The disparity in the ways by which we access our mental states at each level speaks for a form of introspective pluralism. This paper also argues for the idea of introspective pluralism by drawing on insights from developmental psychology and neuropsychology. In conclusion, it speculates that the lowest level of introspection may be underpinned by the phenomenon of ‘priming’.

Torbjörn Tännsjö
A very strong form of epistemic conservatism

Abstract
Whenever a person believes that p, then this individual is ‘justified’ — in a straightforward means/ends sense — in her belief that p. It is then possible to rationalize (and explain) the person’s belief that p with reference to her epistemic goal: to have a realistic view of the world, together with the fact that she believes that p is true.

Kye Palider
Teleological Epistemology: Knowledge-how and Goal-directedness

Abstract
Epistemology characteristically operates at an intellectual level, being primarily restricted to the cognitive states of human individuals and the factors that influence these states. This restriction may be undesirable for a more generalized epistemology that discusses non-individual or non-human systems that may be said to be intelligent, such as communities, animals, and complex systems whose parts may not be independently intelligent. Here, I show how such a generalized epistemology may be possible under a teleological, non-intellectual, and not conventionally mechanical view of knowledge. I establish a teleological schema of knowledge-how, where a system is understood to know how to X if it is capable of being goal-directed towards X. This schema is analogous to how philosophers of biology are increasingly describing organismal agency. After developing this view, I show how it handles many controversial cases of know-how in the literature. I then show how knowledge-that may be constructed out of this teleological know-how, showing that all knowledge may be understood teleologically, without the need to reference to individual human cognitive states. Thereby, I show a generalized approach to epistemology through teleology that can extend naturally to topics in social epistemology and non-human intelligence.

Wolfgang Lenzen
Did St Augustine anticipate “Moore’s Principle”?

Abstract
This paper deals with the question whether in his De mendacio the church father Augustine anticipated what in modern times came to be referred to as “Moore’s Principle”. This law of epistemic logic says that a person is convinced that p, (if and) only if she believes that she knows that p. The present investigation makes use of the formal apparatus of modern epistemic logic as sketched in section 2. The main results of epistemic logic in the later Middle Ages will be summarized in section 3. In particular, it will turn out that a variant of “Moore’s principle” was endorsed by the 14th century logician William Heytesbury in his treatise De Scire et Dubitare. Augustine’s theory of lying and his views concerning the various forms of believing, knowing, and doubting are scrutinized in section 4. If one assumes that the manuscript of De mendacio contains two scribal errors, Augustine recognized that a person believes to know (“putat se scire”) that p just in case that she firmly believes (“firmissime credit”) that p and hence has no doubts at all (“omnino non dubitet”) that p.

Filosofiska Notiser Årgång 11, Nr 1, 2024

More papers will (perhaps) be added to this issue later.

Asger Kirkeby-Hinrup
Interdisciplinary Consciousness Studies needs Philosophers of Science

Abstract
Significant progress has been made over the last couple of decades with respect to empirical investigations of consciousness. The field of interdisciplinary consciousness studies is sprawling and growing at a rapid pace. There is, however, still much to figure out, and the philosophy of science has an important role to play in untangling the complex relationships between theory and empirical data. I start by providing a rough overview of the historical developments over the last couple of decades with an eye to how the research focus has shifted in that time. Next, I describe the current state of the field and highlight some of the core problems in interdisciplinary consciousness studies that would benefit from the involvement of philosophers of science. Finally, I summarize three contemporary endeavors in the attempt to assess and compare theories of consciousness. The goal is to convey that interdisciplinary consciousness studies is a field ripe for the application of philosophy of science, and hopefully inspire philosophers of science to come help us out.

Tero Tulenheimo & Giuseppina Ronzitti
Democracy and Knowledge: Remarks on Brennan and Wikforss

Abstract
We take up Jason Brennan’s critique of democracy as formulated in his monograph Against Democracy (2016) and discuss the arguments that Åsa Wikforss presents against Brennan’s views in her book Därför demokrati (2021). Both authors grant the importance of knowledge for political decision-making, but they differ in their respective understandings of what counts as knowledge and they draw very different conclusions from the relevant knowledge requirement. Our general aim is to detect problems in democracy as well as in attempts to criticize democracy. We also briefly consider Brennan’s positive proposal to replace democracy by “epistocracy”, a form of government according to which only those citizens are entitled to vote who are “competent” in a sense to be discussed. Our aim is not to propagate any particular form of government. We merely wish to help the reader to recognize that democracy in particular involves a whole lot of assumptions that are in need of a better justification than what is normally provided.

John Shand
Utilitarianism is Not a Moral Theory

Abstract
Utilitarianism in order to count as a moral theory would within the theory itself have to identify the moral and distinguish it from the amoral. It fails to do this without calling upon theoretical ethical considerations that are outside the ethical theory available to utilitarianism and such considerations are unexplained by utilitarianism. Utilitarianism fails to circumscribe the moral domain by not identifying what is essential for something to be a moral matter as opposed to an amoral matter. Therefore, utilitarianism taken in itself is not a moral theory.

David Makinson
Attitudes to Limiting Cases in Ancient Logic

Abstract
We draw attention to a tendency of ancient Peripatetic logic echoing into the middle ages and beyond, to disregard limiting cases. Specific instances of this attitude have often been noticed, but they do not seem to have been taken together as illustrating a general pattern. We review the variety of ways in which the tendency manifested itself, discuss its apparent absence or at least reduced presence in Stoic logic, note some exceptions, and speculate on the reasons for its existence. The note raises as many questions as it answers, and should be seen as an invitation to further discussion.

Filosofiska Notiser Årgång 10, Nr 1, 2023

This is a special issue of Filosofiska Notiser. Most of the papers are on metaethics, but the issue also includes some papers on other topics. More articles will (perhaps) be added later.

Kevin DeLapp
Metaethics and the Limits of Philosophy

Abstract
This paper is an investigation of the forces and commitments which drive disagreement between different metaethical affiliations; an investigation we might characterize as meta-metaethics. Various prominent theorists are sorted into one or another of three meta-metaethical camps. This sorting reveals that many instances of metaethical dispute involve theorists talking past one another, and that many theorists who might share a metaethical affiliation actually have more in common methodologically with their opponents than with their compatriots. The diversity of meta-metaethical conceptions is juxtaposed with the ongoing debate concerning Archimedean points in moral theory, and is also shown to be a new version of the general problem of the criterion. Resources from both those debates are then requisitioned to argue for a particular way of adjudicating between competing metaethical theories.

Jussi Suikkanen
Normative Judgments, Motivation, and Evolution

Abstract
This paper first outlines a new taxonomy of different views concerning the relationship between normative judgments and motivation. In this taxonomy, according to the Type A views, a positive normative judgment concerning an action consists at least in part of motivation to do that action. According to the Type B views, motivation is never a constituent of a positive normative judgment even if such judgments have, due to the kind of states they are, a causal power to produce motivation in an agent. Finally, according to the Type C views, a normative judgment can produce motivation only with the help of a third mental state or a distinct substantial local disposition. This paper then outlines a novel evolutionary argument for the Type B views. If we assume that normative judgments’ ability to shape our motivations enabled efficient planning and co-operation, the psychological mechanism responsible for this adaptation should be understood as a proximal mechanism. This paper argues that it is then more likely that we evolved to make normative judgments that have direct causal powers to influence our motivations because such Type B mechanisms are more reliable than the Type C mechanisms. It also suggests that the Type A views are either empirically false or collapse into the Type B views.

Charles Taliaferro
Meta-Ethics and Phenomenology
Does moral experience support Axiological Realism?

Abstract
I argue that axiological realism (there are objective values in ethics, aesthetics, and epistemology) receives prima facie evidential support from experience. This is routinely overlooked by advocates of the desire-preference account of value. I propose that in the absence of defeaters, phenomenology makes axiological realism more reasonable than its denial. Moreover, I contend that moral disagreements do not count as evidence against axiological realism.

Hugh LaFollette
The Self-Made Person: Myth, Reality, and Promise

Abstract
Many of us think we are self-made. Some of us may be, but only qualifiedly. We do not make ourselves directly or from whole cloth. Each of us is shaped by myriad genetic, familial, cultural, and governmental forces. These forces do not eliminate self-control. They do, though, limit some options, expand others, and make achieving still others more or less difficult. Understanding these forces’ scope identifies constraints on our self-making, shows why we are indebted to people who enrich(ed) our lives, and informs and elevates control we do have. This knowledge empowers us to be morally more re-sponsible agents—ones who improve others’ lives, frequently by employing, supporting, and enhancing vital governmental institutions.

Ingmar Persson
Double Troubles for Sidgwick’s Dualism of Practical Reason

Abstract
In The Point of View of the Universe, Katarzyna de Lazari-Radek and Peter Singer attempt to resolve Henry Sidgwick’s ‘Dualism of Practical Reason’ between the rationality of egoism and the rationality of universal benevolence by undermining the former. I argue that, according to their interpretation at least, this dualism involves two troublesome steps: from egoism to impartiality and from impartiality to universal benevolence. I try to show that their attempt to undermine the rationality of egoism fails but go on to sketch another way of undermining it and establish an impartiality or universalizability that is arguably enshrined in the concept of morality. In contrast, the obstacles to the step from impartiality or universalizability to universal benevolence – to which de Lazari-Radek and Singer pay too scant attention – seem insurmountable. Questions about their hedonist conception of well-being are also raised.

Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen
Detaching Betterness From Value

Abstract
This paper discusses whether, as a matter of logic, better-than relations require value-bearing relata. Must an x that is better than y be in any sense good (or, where x is less disvaluable than y, bad?) Examples I provide suggest the contrary—that it is possible for something to be better than something else without having any sort of value (other than betterness). Several reasons for being suspicious of this notion of better-than are considered and questioned.

Alexander Miller and Seth Whittington
A Note on Error Theory and the Refined Moral Problem

Abstract
In this paper, we argue that “The Moral Problem” identified by Michael Smith in his book of that name as “the central organizing problem” of metaethics needs to be refined in order to accommodate moral error theories (in the style of J.L. Mackie), and we suggest a refinement that allows it to do this. We conclude by drawing out some consequences for the formulation of internalism about moral motivation.

Thomas L. Carson
Axiological Realism, Axiological Objectivism, and Moral Experience: A Reply to Taliaferro

Abstract
I argue that 1. moral experience is not evidence for the truth of axiological realism as I define it, 2. because Taliaferro and I give different definitions of axiological realism, he criticizes me for views that I don’t hold, and 3. Taliaferro’s discussion of moral disagreement can’t account for disagreements in which people wield radically different moral concepts.

Charles Pigden
What Thrasymachus Should Have Said

Abstract
In the Republic Thrasymachus argues that ‘justice is the advantage of the stronger’, that is, that the laws and conventions governing a society support the interests of the rulers or the ruling class. Hence acting justly – obeying those laws and customs of one's society in one's dealings with other people – is not necessarily, not usually or maybe not even ever in an agent’s best interests. This is a problem for Plato who wants to prove that it necessarily pays to be just (though as the Republic unfolds, he turns out to have a rather rarefied conception of self-interest as well as a rather rarefied conception of justice). So his spokesman, Socrates, leads Thrasymachus into a trap. Suppose (as surely happens from time to time) the rulers make a mistake and enact laws (or foster customs) that are not in their best interests. In that case justice won’t be to ‘the advantage of the stronger’ and their subjects’ acting justly won’t be in the rulers’ best interests. Clitophon offers Thrasymachus a lifeline. Perhaps justice is what the stronger think is in their interests. But Thrasymachus won’t have a bar of it. If a ruler makes a law or issues an order that is not in his interests, he thereby ceases to be a real ruler. So justice is always to the advantage of the stronger, since if it isn’t, the stronger cease to be strong. This is both decidedly silly and gets him into a lot of dialectical trouble. I suggest on Thrasymachus’ behalf a Darwinian response which entails that justice is usually or at least often to ‘the advantage of the stronger’. This in turn entails that it does not necessarily pay to be just, which negates Plato’s desired conclusion. Indeed, for many people it pays better to be relativisitically unjust, that is not to have a settled commitment to obeying the norms of one’s society. My reconstructed Thrasymachus will be less of a proto-fascist and more of a radical democrat than Plato’s Thrasymachus appears to have been.

Mark van Roojen
Explaining Supervenience

Abstract
It is widely agreed that nonnaturalists incur a burden to explain how it is that the normative or moral must supervene on the nonnormative or nonmoral. This paper argues that every metaethical theory, including naturalist theories, must carry that burden in one way or another. Along the way it notes some troubles for making the naturalism/nonnaturalism distinction precise and relatedly for formulating the supervenience thesis to be explained. It then explores naturalistic options for explaining supervenience, suggests that some of these are better than others, and argues that parallel nonnaturalist theories can generate parallel explanations to those offered by naturalists.

Christian B. Miller
Three Models of Practical Wisdom

Abstract
There are two leading models of practical wisdom in the contemporary analytic philosophy literature, the Standard Model and the Socratic Model. Recently, a neglected third option is starting to get some attention. On the Eliminativist Model, there is no virtue of practical wisdom at all. There are a variety of distinct sets of capacities which carry out the various functions associated with practical wisdom. But there is no trait that they jointly constitute. The goal of this paper is to set out what separates the three models, and what I take some of the main costs to be with the Standard and Socratic Models. While the Eliminativist Model might not be the clearly superior choice of the three models, it deserves to be taken far more seriously in future discussions of practical wisdom.

Michael Smith
The Refined Moral Problem

Abstract
This paper is a response to "A Note on Error Theory and the Refined Moral Problem" by Alexander Miller and Seth Whittington (see above).

Aktuellt nummer

För skribenter