

The Role of Identification for the Motivational Force of Moral Judgments

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Abstract

What is the relationship between judging something as good and being motivated to act on this judgment? Motivational internalism is the thesis that there is a necessary connection between moral judgments and motivation. In contrast, externalists typically believe that a judgment-independent desire is needed for the moral judgment to be motivating. To bridge the gap between internalism and externalism, a few philosophers have appealed to theories of identification-based moral judgments. It has been argued that certain moral judgments that are incompatible with a person's identity can be used to show that not all moral judgments are necessarily motivating, and it has been suggested that it is possible to define a certain *kind* of necessarily motivating identification-based moral judgment. Herein I will examine the role identification plays for moral motivation. I will first analyse an argument that aims to show that internalism is false by claiming that certain identification-incompatible moral judgments preclude motivation. I will argue that this argument does not succeed in showing that internalism is false. Second, I will argue that identification can provide the motivational force needed to make certain identity-based moral judgments necessarily motivating. This identification-based account does however, I will argue, *not* support internalism; despite presenting a kind of moral judgment that is necessarily motivating, this account of the connection between moral judgments and motivation is an externalist account because a judgment-independent desire is a necessary source of its motivational force.

1. INTRODUCTION

What is the relationship between judging something as good and being motivated to act on this judgment? Motivational internalism is the thesis that there is a necessary connection between moral judgments and motivation. If a person judges that it is morally good for her to perform action A, she is

necessarily motivated, to some extent, to perform that action. Externalism is the thesis that some additional contingent fact about the person's psychology – usually the presence of an additional judgment-independent desire – must obtain for a moral judgment to be motivating (Rosati, par.3.2). Externalists have presented cases intending to show that it is possible for an *amoralist* to believe sincerely that an action is morally right without experiencing any motivation whatsoever to perform it (Svavarsdóttir, pp.176–8). This has not convinced internalists, partly because they do not think these judgments are moral or sincere, partly because internalists believe that the requirement of an additional desire for motivation poses a threat to the very nature of morality (Vigani, p.222).

Christian Miller has presented an argument against internalism. This argument is based on Harry Frankfurt's concept of *volitional impossibility*. On Frankfurt's account, a person can care so much about something that she makes it part of her identity. Because the identification with what she cares about constrains her will, she experiences it as a necessity – a volitional necessity – to act in a manner that promotes what she cares about. Consequently, the person can experience an aversion, an aversion that she identifies with, against performing certain incompatible actions – she becomes *unable to bring herself* to perform identity-incompatible actions. Assuming (i) that caring about Alfa implies being motivated to perform A-actions, whereas caring about Beta implies being motivated to perform B-actions, and (ii) that A-actions and B-actions are incompatible in the sense that a person cannot do A if she does B and *vice versa*, a person will experience it as a volitional impossibility to perform A-actions when she cares so much about Beta that it is a volitional necessity for her to perform B-actions (Frankfurt (1982), p.86, Frankfurt (1998), p.182). According to Frankfurt, even when a person judges that action A would be the best thing for her to do (morally or non-morally), she will in cases of volitional impossibility be unable to bring herself to go against who she really is and do what the judgment prescribes (Frankfurt (1998), p.182, Frankfurt (1993), pp.20–1).

In his argument against internalism, Miller claims that volitional impossibility – due to identification with an aversion – is (i) compatible with making a moral judgment that prescribes the A-action, and (ii) incompatible with motivation to act on that moral judgment (Miller (2008a), pp.5,7,11). Hence, if the argument is sound, it is possible to make a moral judgment without being motivated to any extent to act on it, and internalism is false.

Miller also uses identification as an explanation for the connection between judging something as good, and being motivated to act on that judgment. He proposes that a person who *identifies with the moral norms* operative in forming a moral judgment is necessarily motivated by that judgment (Miller (2008a), p.32). He is hesitant as to whether this account is internalist or externalist (Miller (2008a), p.32). This shows that there is two somewhat different internalism-related questions at play. The first one is if moral judgments, in general, are necessarily motivating. The second one is if *any* moral judgments are necessarily or intrinsically motivating. What is crucial for both questions is that no judgment-independent desire should be needed for motivation. Obviously, if no moral judgment is necessarily motivating, it follows that moral judgments in general are not necessarily motivating.

Another identification-based account of the connection between moral judgments and motivation has been provided by Denise Vigani. She argues that moral judgments *of a certain kind* are necessarily motivating, and that this kind of moral judgment is made by a person who *identifies* with her moral values to the extent that she desires to maintain those values and thus remain the same person. Because of the person's moral identity, which on Vigani's account includes the desire for self-consistency, the person will – in a situation where available actions are appropriately linked to her moral identity – judge that it is *her* responsibility and therefore necessary *for her* to perform available good action A (Vigani, pp.213,216,219).

The central question in this paper concerns what role identification plays for the connection between moral judgments and motivation. I will argue that accounts based on identification neither support that internalism is true, nor that it is false. To this end I will focus on two questions: (i) Is Miller's identification-based argument against internalism sound? and (ii) Are there necessarily motivating identification-based moral judgments, and if so, does that support internalism? I will first analyse Miller's argument against internalism and argue that Frankfurt's account of identification-based volitional impossibility is insufficient to show that internalism is false. Second, I will combine Frankfurt, Miller and Vigani to develop an account where identification is the source of a certain kind of moral judgment, a kind that is made when the person is in a state of volitional necessity. I will argue (i) that this kind of moral judgment is necessarily motivating, and (ii) that the account is externalist since the desire for self-consistency, which I will argue is not necessarily linked to the moral judgment, is a necessary source of

motivation. This indicates that the identification-based account cannot show that internalism is true. My aim is to clarify which role identification plays for the connection between moral judgments and motivation by showing that, although identification-based moral judgments can be necessarily motivating, this does not preclude motivation from identification-incompatible moral judgments, and it also does not support internalism.

I begin by specifying the type of internalism under scrutiny in section 2. Next I introduce, in section 3, Frankfurt's account of identification, and the way in which the identity accounts that Miller and Vigani use are modifications and developments of Frankfurt's. Section 4 contains a presentation of Miller's argument against internalism. In section 5, I will analyse Miller's argument and conclude that it does not show that internalism is false. Section 6 contains my development and analysis of Miller's and Vigani's proposal that identification is the source of necessarily motivating moral judgments, as well as a discussion of whether my proposed account, which I deem to be externalist, can meet some internalist concerns.

2. BACKGROUND – INTERNALISM AND EXTERNALISM

2.1 Kinds of motivational internalism

Moral experience suggests that there is a tight connection between judging an action to be right and being motivated to act accordingly. If a person first judges it *right* to A and then becomes convinced that it is *wrong* to A and right to B, we would expect that this person goes *from* being motivated to A *to* ceasing to be motivated to A and instead becoming motivated to B (Rosati, par.1). Motivational internalism – a thesis about the nature of the psychological connection between moral judgments and motivation – explains this reliable change in motivation. According to internalists, motivation is internal to moral judgments, which means that a moral judgment *necessarily* motivates the person who holds it to act accordingly. It is thus *impossible* to make a moral judgment without being motivated to some extent to act on it. Conversely, externalism is the thesis that the connection between moral judgments and motivation is not necessary, which means that the externalist needs another explanation for the apparently reliable connection.

The notion that a moral judgment entails motivation to some extent does not imply that the moral judgment entails action. Competing desires and motives can elicit motivation that overrides the moral judgment-derived

motivation. To show that internalism is false, it is therefore not sufficient to demonstrate that people do not always act as they judge right.

There is a wide range of different internalist positions that I will not exhaust (Rosati, par.2–3, Svavarsdóttir, p.163, Wallace, par.3). Internalism can be defined by means of a *conceptual*, necessary connection between moral judgments and motivation. This implies that internalism is a consequence of *defining* moral judgments as motivating. Moral judgments refer here to judgments asserting that a certain action is *morally* right, good or obligatory in the sense that it concerns the wellbeing of others. A moral judgment is one type of normative judgment, where normative judgments accommodate all evaluative moral and non-moral judgments about something being e.g. good, right, required, desirable, attractive, beautiful or worthwhile (Miller (2007b), p.21, Rosati, par.1–2, Svavarsdóttir, p.165). Defining not only moral judgments, but all normative judgments by reference to their motivational force makes sense to the extent that this is what distinguishes these judgments from e.g. empirical or mathematical judgments (Rosati, par.1). To define internalism as a consequence of the definition of a moral judgment does justice to the label ‘internalism’; if motivation is part of the definition of what a moral judgment is, motivation is certainly *internal* to the moral judgment. However, defining moral judgments as motivating renders internalism true by definition and therefore cannot serve as an argument for internalism. As argued by Sigrun Svavarsdóttir, this version of internalism prevents judgments that do not elicit motivation from being *moral* judgments, and it prevents examination of the way in which moral judgments give rise to motivation, as well as examination of what determines variation between persons (Svavarsdóttir, pp.181–2). The possibility that externalism is true is ‘defined away’ without an explanation from the internalist of what it is about moral judgments that make them necessarily motivating (Rosati, par.3.2). Therefore, the type of connection that I will examine is not a conceptual one, i.e. it is not a connection that follows from defining moral judgments as motivating.

Internalism is considered here as a thesis of moral psychology. The two main types of internalism are weak and strong internalism. Weak internalism allows for a desire – necessarily linked to the judgment – to be the source of motivation, whereas strong internalism requires that the judgment itself is the sole source of motivation (Miller (2008a), pp.2–3,29, Rosati, par.3.2, Svavarsdóttir, pp.163,168). Hence, for the strong internalist, the judgment itself is psychologically sufficient for motivation. If a person judges that

honesty is morally good and also is motivated to be honest, the advocate of strong internalism would *not* allow for the motivation to derive from *a desire to be honest*, even if that desire was necessarily linked to the person's moral judgment. On the contrary, the weak internalist allows for *the desire to be honest* – if it is necessarily linked to the person's moral judgment such that it is either a necessary source or consequence of the judgment – to be the source of motivation. Miller's argument targets both strong and weak internalism. I will argue that it is unsuccessful against both.

Externalism is the view that, in addition to the moral judgment, some other contingent fact about the person's psychology is required for motivation. The externalist thus claims that the connection between moral judgments and motivation is *contingent* and not *necessary*. Usually, the contingent fact about the person's psychology is understood as a judgment-independent desire, e.g. a judgment-independent desire to be moral (Svavarsdóttir, pp.161,195, Vigani, p.210). Externalism is supported by cases where people fail to be motivated by their moral judgments. Externalists claim that it is possible for a person to be an *amoralist*. Amoralists are capable of moral reasoning, they can engage in moral debate and they make moral judgments – demonstrating competence and sincerity in their use of moral concepts – but (i) they are not to any extent interested in acting in accordance with their moral judgments, not even when it is uncostly, (ii) they deny that moral judgments are reasons for any of their actions, and (iii) they deny that they are motivated by them (Svavarsdóttir, pp.176–8). In line with how externalists use the amoralist, Miller's argument aims to show that it is possible to make a moral judgment without being motivated to any extent to act on it.

Internalists have responded to the externalist challenge of the amoralist in different ways: by claiming that the amoralists' motivation is so weak that they do not know they are motivated, by claiming that the amoralists' judgments are not sincere, e.g. that they are judgments about *what other people think* is morally right, and by claiming that their judgments are not moral because the amoralists fail to make competent use of moral concepts (Svavarsdóttir, p.178, Vigani, p.222).

Internalists have also suggested that the amoralist is practically irrational. 'Internalism with a practical rationality constraint' is the view that moral judgments are either motivating for the agent, or, the agent is practically irrational (Miller (2008a), p.21, Rosati, par.3.2, Suikkanen, p.2). The consequent reformulation of externalism becomes: In addition to a moral

judgment, a contingent fact about the person – other than practical rationality – must obtain for motivation to arise. Opinions diverge regarding what practical rationality consist in. For the purposes of this paper it is sufficient to (i) note that the definition of practical rationality as ‘being motivated by a moral judgment’ would again define away the possibility of externalism, and (ii) provide Miller’s account of practical rationality, i.e. “An agent S is practically rational to the extent that S’s practical thought and action are guided by what S takes to be S’s reasons for action from the first person perspective” (Miller (2008a), pp.22–3, Svavarsdóttir, pp.164,197, Wallace, par.5). One kind of practical irrationality referred to by both Frankfurt and Miller is *weakness of will*, which in general implies acting against one’s better judgment, e.g. keep reading a mystery novel while judging that it would be best to work on a philosophy paper that is due (Wallace, par.1). Frankfurt illustrates weakness of will by means of *the unwilling addict* who acts on the desire to take the drug although she (i) judges that it would be best not to take the drug, (ii) has decided that she does not want to be motivated by the desire to take the drug, and (iii) identifies with the desire to not take the drug. The definition of weakness of will that both Frankfurt and Miller use is ‘acting on desires that the person does not identify with’, which implies acting as a non-agent (Frankfurt (1971), p.18, Miller (2008a), p.17). I will argue that Miller has not succeeded in showing that ‘internalism with a practical rationality constraint’ is false.

2.2 Internalism in relation to humanism and cognitivism

To accurately specify the type of internalism I am examining, I need to address also humanism and cognitivism. The type of internalism under scrutiny here is a non-humean, cognitivist account.

Humeans and non-humeans disagree about whether motivation derives from a desire or not. Humeans claim that the *sole* source of motivation must lie in a desire, a desire that cannot be derived from a belief. Non-humeans can accept that a desire needs to be present, but they deny that a desire is the sole source of motivation. In contrast to non-humeans, humeans claim that there can be no necessary connection between beliefs and desires (Miller (2008b), p.22).

Cognitivists hold that moral judgments are cognitive belief-like mental states and non-cognitivists hold that they are conative desire-like mental states (Rosati, par.3.1). The humean internalist argument against cognitivism takes these premises: (i) humanism: motivation always has its source in a

desire (ii) internalism: moral judgments are necessarily motivating, (iii) any mental state is either belief-like or desire-like (and never both), and (iv) Hume's dictum: there are no necessary connections between distinct entities. It concludes from these premises that a moral judgment is a desire-like state (Suikkanen, p.3). This argument is meant to show that internalism is incompatible with the conjunction of humeanism and cognitivism.

The present paper examines a non-humean, cognitivist account of internalism. This means that a moral judgment here refers to a cognitive belief-like state, that motivation does not necessarily arise from a desire, and that a necessary connection between beliefs and desires is not impossible. As described in 2.1, our moral experience suggests that there is a tight connection between moral judgments and motivation. Taking humeanism and cognitivism into account, the internalism-related question is: Provided that moral judgments are cognitive belief-like states, is this cognitive state *sufficient* to elicit a motivation-state, where the latter is a conative desire-like state? Externalists claim that it is not. They claim that, in addition to the judgment, motivation requires also an independent conative state (Vigani, p.210).

3. BACKGROUND – IDENTIFICATION

The three accounts of identification that I will use are formulated or inspired by Frankfurt (Frankfurt (1971), pp.19–21, Frankfurt (1982), pp.84–93, Frankfurt (1987), pp.167–9). Each account will be followed by a short presentation of what the authors or their interpreters regard as the motivational force of identification.

3.1 Frankfurt

3.1.1 Frankfurt's account of identification

To qualify as a *person* on Frankfurt's view, it should be important to the individual that there is no conflict between how she wants to act and how she acts. This is what motivates the individual to evaluate her desires. The evaluation of desires is the basis for the person's decision of what desires she wants to be motivated by. The reflexive nature of consciousness, i.e. the ability to monitor one's own desires and motives, makes humans capable of this. The person cares about which desires that motivate her actions. She wants those desires to be desires that she has (i) evaluated as good, and (ii) identified with. She does not want to be motivated regardless of her own identity (Frankfurt (1987), p.163). Identification is on Frankfurt's view based

on normative judgments regarding the desirability of desires. Frankfurt emphasises that these normative judgments are not necessarily moral, but that they can concern loyalty to a friend or caring about mathematical truth or a personal goal. They are about what the *person* values in *her* life (Frankfurt (1971), p.19, Frankfurt (1982), p.81).

According to Frankfurt, the person constitutes her own identity by forming a certain type of second-order desires called second-order volitions. A second-order desire is a desire about a desire – *the desire to desire A*, where Frankfurt restricts *A* to actions. A second-order volition is a desire to be motivated in action by a certain desire – *the person wants (or desires) the desire to A to motivate her to the extent that she attempts to A* (Frankfurt (1971), pp.13–5). Second-order volitions illustrate that the person is capable of wanting to be different, of wanting other desires and motives for her actions than those she currently has (Frankfurt (1971), p.12). Unlike other second-order desires, second-order volitions entail the first-order desire to *A*, and they concern *the will*. When a person wants the desire to *A* to be the desire that moves her to action, she wants the desire to *A* to become her will (Frankfurt (1971), p.15, Frankfurt (1987), pp.163,170, Velleman, p.175).

Two things are important about the will. Firstly, it refers to those desires that are *effective* in moving a person to action; the will does not merely motivate an agent *to some degree* to act, but it implies *overriding* motivation in the sense that the person who has ‘the will to *A*’ will attempt to *A* if she has the opportunity to *A* (Frankfurt (1971), p14,20, Frankfurt (1982), p.86, Frankfurt (1998), p.182). Secondly, it belongs to the agent – it is that by which *she, the agent*, moves *herself* (Frankfurt (1982), p.84). Hence, only those desires by which a person wants to be moved to action – only desires that are objects of second-order volition – constitute the will. Desires that drive a person to action without her wanting them to, without her identifying with them, like the drug-taking desire of the unwilling addict, do not belong to a person’s will, and the person lacks a sense of agency when she acts on those desires (Frankfurt (1971), pp.14–5, Frankfurt (1982), p.86, Frankfurt (1987), p.163, Velleman, pp.172,177). Hence, *the will* pertains to effective desires that are the object of second-order volitions.

The agent has the power to constitute her identity structure by forming second-order volitions and also by deciding on the relative priority of her different second-order volitions (Frankfurt (1971), p.21, Frankfurt (1982), p.91, Frankfurt (1987), pp.167–9). This ultimately influences her will. In order to resolve conflicts about what she really wants, the person can make

an autonomous decision concerning the relative priority of her second-order volitions, which entails a commitment that she takes responsibility for (Frankfurt (1971), pp.21–2, Frankfurt (1987), pp.164–5, Frankfurt (1998), pp.170–3). Frankfurt also formulates the agent’s power to constitute her own identification and will in terms of *caring*. A person can start caring about, say, a project, and this entails that she has made it part of her self and that it makes an important difference to her if it goes well or bad for the project (Frankfurt (1982), pp.91–3, Frankfurt (1993), p.20). Caring and ‘second-order volition structuring’ have the same preconditions, they play the same constituting role for the will and they both involve an inherent commitment. However, whereas second-order volitions only take desires (or the will) as object, caring can take e.g. values, persons, projects and habits as objects (Frankfurt (1982), pp.82–4, 92–3). Caring thus consist in a set of second-order volitions that promotes that which is cared for. A person who cares about Beta forms second-order volitions that constitute dissociations from desires that she regards as inconsistent with what she cares about, thus protecting her identification with Beta and enhancing her commitment. If the person wants to be motivated in her actions by the desire to B which promotes Beta, she also wants the desire to not-B *not* to motivate her actions, and the *aversion against* not-B to motivate her actions (Frankfurt (1971), pp.6, 18, Frankfurt (1982), pp.87–8).

Relevant for Miller’s argument is that, although the person has the power to constitute her will, Frankfurt emphasises that the will is also *constrained* by the person’s identification. As a consequence, the person can be subject to a *feeling of necessity* with respect to some actions. A person can identify with and care so much about Beta that she *cannot bring herself* to do anything else but that which promotes Beta. It is a *volitional necessity* to promote what she cares about. The necessity of this situation becomes apparent when the alternative course of action – A – strikes her as *volitionally impossible* and *unthinkable* to perform (Frankfurt (1982), pp.85–6, Frankfurt (1993), p.20). Despite having the opportunity and the power to do A, the person experiences an aversion that implies that it is volitionally impossible. This is because of the way that she has formed her will, the limits of which, Frankfurt argues, constitute her sense of self (Frankfurt (1998), pp.187–8, Frankfurt (1993), p.22). What is important for the argument in section 4 is that, on Frankfurt’s account, a person who judges that *it would be best to A* can experience that it is volitionally impossible to A. Because of who the person feels that she truly is, she can experience that she *has no choice* but to B (see 4.1 for an example,

Frankfurt (1971), p.15, Frankfurt (1982), pp.85–7, Frankfurt (1998), pp.181, 184, Frankfurt (1993), pp.20–1).

3.1.2 The motivational force of Frankfurt's identification

Frankfurt's identification implies a commitment to how one wants the will to be structured. It is obvious, however, as the unwilling addict illustrates, that identification can fail to form the will. Competing desires may provide stronger motivation than the desires that the person *wants to* be moved by. Even if conflict persists after a person has decided how she wants her will to be structured, a successful decision to commit changes the nature of the conflict, from being a conflict between desires, to being a conflict between the self and a desire (Frankfurt (1987), p.172).

David Velleman notices that it is not obvious that a desire would become more motivating or effective just because a person wants it to be effective. He offers an interpretation of Frankfurt's texts that explains how 'the desire to A' becomes more motivating because the person wants it to motivate her actions. Based on Frankfurt's focus on reflexivity and his characterisation of how a second-order volition entails a first-order desire, Velleman understands the formation of 'a second-order volition to A' as a simultaneous formation of 'a first-order desire for *the self* to A' (Frankfurt (1971), p.15, Frankfurt (1987), pp.163,170, Velleman, p.175). Thus, if the desire to A is already present in the person's psychology prior to the formation of the second-order volition, this second reflexive first-order desire provides additional motivational force. If the desire was not already present in the person's psychology, the new reflexive first-order desire will provide the only motivational force.

Volitional necessity illustrates the motivational force of identification. What Miller suggests is that identification, understood as identity-inflicted constraints on the will, can preclude motivation for an alternative identity-incompatible action that the individual judges to be morally right. This, Miller claims, would show that moral judgments are not necessarily motivating.

3.2 Miller

3.2.1 Miller's views on identification

Miller holds, like Frankfurt, that a person identifies with what she cares about, which implies that she has made it important to herself (Miller (2008a), pp.10,18, Miller (2008b), p.35). Also in line with Frankfurt, Miller

offers no special status for moral as compared to non-moral normative judgments (Frankfurt (1971), p.19, Frankfurt (1982), pp.81–2, Miller (2008a), pp.3,32, Miller (2007b), p.21). Miller argues, however, that a successful account of identification should place more weight on the underlying normative judgments and less weight on second-order volitions (Miller (2007a), pp.7–9,13).

On Miller's account, an agent with a normative judgment, who also cares about and therefore identifies with the norms operative in forming the judgment, will *disown* actions counter to the judgment because she in those cases acts counter to her identification and therefore like a non-agent. To identify with something is, according to Miller, to align oneself with it and thereby take responsibility for it as representative of one's own outlook on the world (Miller (2008a), pp.13,16, Miller (2008b), p.2, Miller (2007a), pp.20–1, Miller (2007b), p.38).

3.2.2 The motivational force of Miller's identification

Miller proposes that identification has the potential to make both moral and non-moral normative judgments motivating. The connection between a normative judgment and motivation is according to Miller: Necessarily, if an agent judges that some available action is (morally or civilly or ...) right for the agent to perform, and the agent identifies with some of the norms operative in forming the judgment, then the agent is motivated at least to some extent to perform that action. Hence, on Miller's view, identification provides motivational force (Miller (2008a), p.32). He underlines that the motivational force does not reside in the second-order volitions *per se* but in their underlying normative judgments and in caring about or identifying with the norms operative in forming them. According to Miller, identifying with a norm involves identifying with desires, normative beliefs and judgments that the norm licenses (Miller (2008b), p.34, Miller (2007a), p.20).

On Miller's view, an agent needs to understand a consideration as normative for it to be a reason for her to act. An agent's motivating reason is a reason that the agent takes as good; it is normative in the agent's own lights and thus portrays the action as desirable, good or attractive (Miller (2008a), p.5). Miller also holds that an agent can only be motivated if she has at least one motivating reason, which means that a motivating reason is necessary for motivation, although it may not be sufficient. Hence, taking a judgment or a reason as normative is necessary for motivation on Miller's view (Miller (2008a), pp.12–5).

Miller claims that a person who *fails to identify* with the norms operative in forming a normative judgment is not necessarily motivated by it. Miller uses two examples to illustrate failures in identification. Firstly, a person who makes a normative judgment based on norms that she has been habituated to during her upbringing, but that she no longer endorses or identifies with, might not be motivated by the normative judgment. Secondly, if an agent has the sincere belief that it is obligatory for her to A because of the norms of her society, she can still fail to identify with the judgment if she does not care about being the kind of person who follows norms of that kind, and motivation would not necessarily follow (Miller (2008a), p.31). This seems to suggest that, on Miller's view, the normative judgment is guaranteed to be *normative for the agent* when she *identifies* with the norms operative in forming the judgment (see 6.2). However, when the agent *fails to identify* with the norms operative in forming the normative judgment, it is unclear if Miller claims that the normative judgment is not normative in the agent's own lights, and therefore not motivating, or, if the agent – although she does take the judgment as normative in her own lights – does not care about it in the sense that she sees it as important for her identity, and therefore is not motivated by it. The role of norm identification for motivation hence remains unclear in this sense.

3.3 Vigani

Vigani's account of identity is based on Augusto Blasi's Frankfurt-inspired *self model*. Vigani focuses on identity as a source of identification, or, identity as a source of a certain type of necessarily motivating moral judgments. In section 6, I will use Vigani's account of identification-based necessarily motivating moral judgments to develop Miller's proposal of the connection between moral judgments and motivation. Before turning to the role identity plays for motivation, I will give a characterisation of Blasi's model for identification.

3.3.1 Vigani's account of identification

A person with *immature* identity may, according to Blasi's model, identify with e.g. physical characteristics. A *mature* identity, on the other hand, implies that the person intentionally has *chosen* moral values – *objective* identity content – to be part of her *subjective* identity experience or sense of self. The person with mature subjective identity has chosen to make some aspects of morality important to her self in the sense that she has integrated

them in her identity structure. The autonomous choice implies that the agent constitutes herself by appropriating values that she organises hierarchically into an identity structure, where e.g. the value of fairness could take priority over loyalty (Hardy&Carlo, pp.234–6, Vigani, pp.214–6).

The experience of autonomously having chosen one's identity gives rise to a stronger sense of agency and an experience of ownership, which, according to Blasi's self model, creates a sense of responsibility to protect the own identity, i.e. a sense of obligation to live in agreement with the identity (Hardy&Carlo, pp.234,236). The stronger the experience of autonomous choice, the stronger the sense of ownership, which entails a stronger desire to keep the identity – *a desire for self-consistency* – and *a sense of responsibility* to protect it. Part of having a mature identity with moral content thus consists in a desire for self-consistency and a responsibility to act self-consistently (Hardy&Carlo, pp.235–7, Vigani, pp.214–6). When faced with certain situations where available actions are appropriately linked with a persons mature moral identity, this person will therefore make a kind of moral judgment called a *judgment of responsibility*. A person who makes a judgment of responsibility makes two judgments: (i) the judgment that an available action A is morally good or right, and (ii) the judgment that it is necessary for her to A because it is her responsibility (Hardy&Carlo, p.235, Vigani, pp.219,223).

3.3.2 The motivational force of Vigani's identification

Proceeding from Blasi's model, Vigani argues that judgments of responsibility are *necessarily* motivating. When a person judges that *it is necessary for her to perform available action A that she judges right*, the objective identity content, i.e. the aspect of morality that is essential to her sense of self, derives its motivational force from the subjective identity, i.e. that her sense of self is at stake (Hardy&Carlo, p.236, Vigani, p.216).

Vigani emphasises that there is a wide range of moral judgments. She claims that no internalist has ever intended to assert that *all* kinds of moral judgments are intrinsically motivating. Judgments about what is good *for other people* are not expected to be motivating (Vigani, pp.211–212,225). Thus, if Sally judges that it is right for Harry to keep his promise, Sally will not be motivated by her judgment. Likewise, a person who is struck by 'bystander apathy' would according to Vigani judge that *it is good for someone to perform help-action A in the particular situation*, but not that it is good for her specifically. This is, Vigani suggests, because the person does

not identify with the relevant moral values (Vigani, p.219). This restriction on internalism is compatible with internalist accounts formulated as: Necessarily, if an individual sincerely judges that *she* ought to A, then *she* is motivated to some extent to A (Rosati, par.3.2).

Vigani also suggests that judgments that do not concern the situation that the agent is in – that do not satisfy what she calls ‘the circumstances requirement’ – are not expected to be motivating, and emphasises that our internalist intuition is weak for moral judgments made about unavailable actions. Although internalist accounts often are underdetermined regarding the circumstances requirement (e.g. Rosati, par.3.2, Svavarsdóttir, p.178, Vigani, p.226, Suikkanen, p.2), Vigani points out that some philosophers argue that internalism should not be restricted to moral judgments that concern actions that are available to the agent (Vigani, pp.225–6). In this context it is worth noting that the moral judgment that Miller uses concerns both an *available* action, and what is good to do *for the person* who makes the judgment.

Hence, the internalism-related question that Vigani examines is not whether moral judgments in general are necessarily motivating, but whether it is possible to define *a kind* of moral judgment that is necessarily and intrinsically motivating. In line with the more generally held internalist position that moral judgments are necessarily motivating, the internalist claim relevant to Vigani’s question is still that no additional judgment-independent desire is necessary for this kind of moral judgment to be motivating.

The type of moral judgment that is necessarily motivating according to Vigani is a moral judgment that consists in an ascription of a moral property *to a particular action* that is *available* in the particular situation, and that *links the agent to the situation and potential action* – a moral judgment of the form *It is necessary for me to perform morally good available action A at the present point in time* (Vigani, pp.212–3,216,219). However, Vigani stresses that the source of motivation resides in the sense of self being at stake (Vigani, p.216). This suggests that ‘the circumstances requirement’, i.e. that the moral judgment concerns an available action, and what I call ‘the self requirement’, i.e. that the moral judgment ties the agent to the available action, are not sufficient. Unless a person would only make a judgment of the form *It is necessary for me to perform morally good available action A at the present point in time* when she identifies with the moral values involved, the judgment of responsibility that is claimed to be necessarily motivating needs to be defined also as having its source in identification.

Vigani aims to explain our mix of internalist and externalist intuitions. She accordingly explains the reliable connection between moral judgments and motivation by proposing that most people identify with some moral values. Her account also has the advantage of accommodating externalist intuitions about the amoralist. Whether or not a person will make a certain judgment of responsibility in a certain context depends on the contents of her moral identity, i.e. on the objective identity content. Vigani notes that we on her account do not have to say about the amoralist that she is irrational or that she makes an insincere or non-moral judgment. Instead, due to a lack of mature identity or a lack of adequate contextual setting that matches the amoralist's moral values, the amoralist does not make judgments of responsibility, which is why it is possible for her not to be motivated by her judgments (Vigani, p.221).

4. MILLER'S ARGUMENT

Miller uses Frankfurt's concept of volitional impossibility to argue that internalism is false. According to Miller, volitional impossibility is both compatible with making a certain moral judgment, and incompatible with the agent having motivating reasons, and therefore with the agent being motivated. Hence, the strategy for showing that moral judgments are not necessarily motivating is to show that it is possible to make a moral judgment without being motivated by it.

4.1 Volitional impossibility

A person can care so much about something that she *cannot bring herself* to do anything else but that which promotes what she cares about. It is *unthinkable* to act counter to what she cares about; it is a *volitional impossibility*. The example Miller uses is Frankfurt's adoption-or-not case (Miller (2008a), pp.8,12). A parent judges that it would be best for him to 'give the child up for adoption' (action A); he decides to A, desires to A, intends to A and sets out to A. But the parent cares about and identifies with the relationship with his child. He therefore discovers that, when the time comes, he cannot bring himself to A (Frankfurt (1998), pp.181,184, Frankfurt (1993), p.20). Instead it is a volitional *necessity* to promote that which he cares about and 'keep the child' (action B).

Since this person cares about and has identified with B-actions and B-desires, he protects his commitment by also forming second-order volitions that dissociates him from incompatible desires and identifies him with an

aversion against A-ing (Frankfurt (1971), pp.6,18, Frankfurt (1982), pp.87–8). When he experiences that it is impossible to A, this is neither because he lacks the opportunity or power to do it, nor because he has changed his mind. It is because he does not have *the will* to do it, where, recall, the will refers to overridingly motivating desires that the agent wants to be motivated by in action. The person that experiences volitional impossibility ('the VI-person' henceforth) has formed and structured his will – by coming to care about things, by forming and structuring second-order volitions – in such a way that he cannot will to A. Doing A would defy the limits of his will. Because the person fully endorses and identifies with the aversion that defying his will entails, action A is not genuinely among his options (Frankfurt (1982), pp.85–6, Frankfurt (1998), pp.181–4, Frankfurt (1993), pp.20–21). Hence, in cases of volitional impossibility, the agent is averse to A-ing and fully identifies with the aversion (Miller (2008a), p.7).

The VI-person experiences that he *has no choice* but to B. This lack of control differs significantly from that of the unwilling addict. Both the unwilling addict and the VI-person act counter to their normative judgment. But when the unwilling addict is *unable* to 'not take the drug', she instead acts on the desire that she *does not identify with*, which makes it a case of *weakness* of will (Frankfurt (1971), pp.13,18). In contrast, when the VI-person is *unable* to A, he instead acts in accordance with his will, which rather makes it a case of *strength* of will. Since a person's identity, on Frankfurt's view, consists in the limits of that person's will, the notion of A-ing defies not only the limits of the person's will but his very sense of self. Contrarily, B-ing, which is a volitional necessity, is experienced as liberating and as an expression of the person's true self (Frankfurt (1971), p.15, Frankfurt (1982), pp.85–7, Frankfurt (1998), pp.181,184, Frankfurt (1993), p.21, Miller (2008a), p.8).

4.2 Miller's argument against internalism

Miller modifies the adoption case to fit his purposes of arguing against internalism. First, regarding the point in time when the person chooses between available actions A and B, Miller takes Frankfurt's characterisation of the VI-person as *not having changed his mind* (Frankfurt (1993), p.20) to imply that the person can be seen as making the normative judgment at the same time as he experiences volitional impossibility. Second, Miller separates the VI-person's normative judgment into a moral and a non-moral part. The parent thus judges that it is *morally* right for him to A (give the

child up for adoption). It remains possible on Miller's view that he does *not* judge that it is non-morally best for him to A (Miller (2008a), pp.8–9). Hence, in Miller's VI-scenario, it is volitionally impossible for the agent to A if and only if, and because, the agent's psychological architecture is such that the agent is strongly averse to the agent's A-ing, and the agent identifies with the aversion. *Simultaneously* the agent makes the moral judgment: *It is morally right (or good or obligatory or ...) for me to perform available action A in this situation* (Miller (2008a), pp.6–8). Identification here refers to Frankfurt's identification since it is internal to what constitutes volitional impossibility.

The argument against strong internalism is structured as follows:

(1) The agent judges that available action A is morally right (or good ...) for him to perform, and the agent finds it volitionally impossible to A, i.e. he is overwhelmingly averse to A-ing and identifies with this aversion.

(2) Experiencing it as volitionally impossible to A at time *t* entails that the agent has no motivating reasons to A at time *t*.

(3) What motivates the agent involves motivating reasons.

Therefore it is possible for the agent to judge that available action A is morally right for him to perform and yet not be motivated to any extent. Hence, strong internalism is false (Miller (2008a), pp.5,11,14).

Premise 1, i.e. that the agent makes a moral judgment that prescribes A, and experiences volitional impossibility to A simultaneously, rests according to Miller on the VI-person not having changed his mind about the moral considerations (Miller (2008a), p.11). To support premise 2, Miller claims that volitional impossibility is incompatible with there being any normative appeal for the agent to A: "in cases of volitional impossibility, the agent is *fully* behind his aversion to A, and the prospect of him A-ing has no normative appeal" (Miller (2008a), p.12). Miller argues that motivating reasons, in virtue of being reasons, must carry some normative weight for the agent. Provided that motivating reasons always have some normative force for the agent *and* that volitional impossibility is incompatible with the agent having "reasons whose normative force he appreciates", volitional impossibility must be inconsistent with having motivating reasons (Miller (2008a), pp.12,23). Miller thus places the moral judgment at the same point

in time as the volitional impossibility to ensure that the latter can affect the motivating reasons that the moral judgment can (or cannot) give rise to.

According to Miller's definition of what constitute *reasons*, they are always normative in the agent's own lights. Reasons function to rationalise the agent's actions to himself, and therefore promote self-understanding. An *agent* always acts for reasons, Miller claims. This precludes the existence of *unconscious* reasons (for the agent), which, Miller argues, would not necessarily be normative in the agent's own lights. A person who acted on unconscious considerations would be devoid of self-understanding and not experience agency (Miller (2008a), pp.9–10,13,18,25, Miller (2008b), pp.3,12). Miller argues that *the agent* at the time of volitional impossibility has ceased to care about the moral considerations attached to the moral norm. Consequently the moral considerations that the moral judgment is based on have *ceased to be reasons* for the agent (Miller (2008a), pp.10,18).

According to premise 3, what motivates the agent involves motivating reasons. Hence, motivating reasons are necessary, however not necessarily sufficient, for motivation (Miller (2008a), p.14). Premise 3 is based on the first person perspective of how motivation works. On Miller's view, that which motivates an *agent* justifies his actions to himself. This implies that what motivates the agent is the content of his mental states rather than the mental states themselves. To explain this, he uses an example: When a person says "I bought the second volume of her series because the first one was so good." (Miller (2008a), p.15), we do not think of 'the *belief* that the first volume was good' as that which motivates the agent, but 'the *putative fact* that the first volume was good', as that which motivates him, i.e. what he takes as a fact, which is *the content* of his mental state. Hence, on Miller's view, what motivates the agent involves at least one motivating reason construed as the content of his mental state (Miller (2008a), p.15). Furthermore, Miller argues that rejecting premise 3 involves rejection of the claim that motivation for agents is always normative from the agent's perspective and that such a rejection risks rendering 'motivation for agents' a mere causal matter (Miller (2008a), p.14).

Miller also rejects weak internalism using the case of volitional impossibility. Also for this argument, the starting-point is that an agent makes a moral judgment in a situation of volitional impossibility, only that here the judgment generates a desire to do what the judgment prescribes. The agent thus judges that available action A is morally right for her to perform, *and has a judgment-derived desire to A*. At the same time the agent is over-

whelmingly averse to A-ing and identifies with this aversion. Volitional impossibility reveals that the agent does not identify with the desire and Miller claims that this precludes the agent from having a motivating reason to A. Miller further claims that *the agent* cannot be motivated by a desire that he does not identify with: “Given that it is volitionally impossible [...] this desire is one which he would repudiate *as a force operative in his psychology with which he does not identify*. Thus *qua* human being the desire can still be causally efficacious, but *qua* agent it is not part of his motivational life” (Miller (2008a), pp.5,11, my emphasis).

Lastly, Miller rejects ‘internalism with a practical rationality constraint’, the disjunctive thesis that a moral judgment is either motivating for the agent *or* the agent is practically irrational. Miller thus claims that the agent who is not motivated by his moral judgment also is not practically irrational. Practical rationality, on Miller’s account, implies that the agent is guided in his practical *thought and action* by what he takes to be his own reasons for action. Hence, provided that Miller succeeds in showing that the agent who experiences volitional impossibility has no reasons for acting on the moral judgment, it follows that he is not practically irrational when unmotivated (Miller (2008a), pp.22–3).

5. ANALYSIS OF MILLER’S ARGUMENT

5.1 Overview of the analysis

In section 5.2, I will argue that Miller does not succeed in showing that volitional impossibility precludes motivation from either a moral judgment or a judgment-derived desire. I will start, in 5.2.1, by arguing that Miller fails to demonstrate that Frankfurt’s account of volitional impossibility is incompatible with having a motivating reason to A, and that he consequently does not succeed in showing that strong internalism is false. Next, in 5.2.2, I will argue that the argument against weak internalism either has the same problem or hinges on a faulty definition of the agent. Lastly, premise 1 asserts that volitional impossibility is compatible with making a certain moral judgment. In 5.3, I will examine if volitional impossibility is incompatible with making the kind of moral judgment that Miller uses and conclude that it is not.

5.2 Is Frankfurt’s volitional impossibility incompatible with motivation?

5.2.1 Is volitional impossibility incompatible with reasons?

In Miller’s line of reasoning supporting premise 2, I will argue that (i) and (iii) below are false.

- (i) Volitional impossibility is incompatible with normativity in the agent's own lights because the VI-person identifies with the aversion he experiences.
- (ii) All reasons are normative to some extent in the agent's own lights.
- (iii) Volitional impossibility is incompatible with the agent having reasons.
- (iv) Volitional impossibility is incompatible with the agent having motivating reasons (premise 2).

Frankfurt's VI-person judges that it would be (morally or non-morally) best to A at time 1 and then experiences, at time 2, that it is volitionally impossible; he cannot bring himself to A. The reason the person experiences it as volitionally impossible to A, despite judging it best, is that he is attempting to defy the limits of his will (Frankfurt (1971), p.20, Frankfurt (1998), pp.182,188, Frankfurt (1993), pp.21–3). His will has been formed by identification, i.e. him coming to care about B-things and forming second-order volitions compatible with B-desires and A-aversion. He has an identity structure that is aligned with B and not A, i.e. with keeping the child, and not giving it up for adoption (Frankfurt (1971), pp.6,18, Frankfurt (1982), pp.87–8, Frankfurt (1993), pp.20–1). The VI-person does not have the will to A; he, as an agent, does not have overriding motivation to A (Frankfurt (1971), pp.14,20, Frankfurt (1982), p.84, Frankfurt (1998), p.182). Hence, volitional impossibility is incompatible with the agent having *overriding* motivation to A. What is not stated, however, is that volitional impossibility precludes *motivation to any extent* (Frankfurt (1971), p.15).

Does Frankfurt's account support that volitional impossibility (to A) is incompatible with the agent having a reason that he takes as normative? Frankfurt's VI-person has both a reason to A, a desire to A, has decided to A and sets out to A, only to realise, when the opportunity of A-ing arises, that it is volitionally impossible for him to A. What is important with regard to Miller's argument seems to be that Frankfurt's VI-person has *a reason* to A, and that Frankfurt, in line with Miller's constraints on reasons, describes this reason as normative in the agent's own lights (Frankfurt (1998), pp.181–2). It is unclear on Miller's account if having a subjectively normative reason is merely necessary, or also sufficient, for having a motivating reason, i.e. if the fact that the agent has a reason that he takes as normative entails that he has a motivating reason (Miller (2008a), p.5). However, this does not affect the conclusion, i.e. that Miller does not convincingly establish the truth of

premise 2, the reasoning for which requires that volitional impossibility is incompatible with having any reasons (that the agent takes as normative) for acting on the moral judgment (Miller (2008a), p.12).

One might object that Frankfurt's VI-person has reason to A at the point in time when he first makes the judgment, but that this reason could be absent when the situation for acting on the judgment arises, i.e. when he is in a situation of experiencing the aversion that he identifies with. In line with this objection, Miller claims that the moral considerations underlying the moral judgment *ceases to be reasons* at the time of volitional impossibility (Miller (2008a), p.13).

To respond to this objection I will argue that Frankfurt's literary example of volitional impossibility suggests that the main character recognises his own reasons as speaking in favour of A-ing all through the state of volitional impossibility, i.e. that the considerations do *not* cease to be reasons for the agent at the time of volitional impossibility. His example is taken from an Anthony Trollope novel where Lord Fawn is the VI-person. Lord Fawn is about to interview a man who in his eyes is uncultivated, and who is supposed to have witnessed Lord Fawn's fiancée Lizzie embracing another man down by the rocks. Lord Fawn has judged that it is best for him to ask the man about what he saw, he has decided to do so, and he has reason to do so because he wants to know what his fiancée did. Consequently, he sets out to ask the man about what he saw. But then, during the interview, the uncultivated man winks at Lord Fawn as if to imply a connection between the two of them. At this point in time Lord Fawn finds that "[e]very feeling of his nature revolted against the task before him [...] He *could not bring himself* to inquire minutely as to poor Lizzie's flirting" (Frankfurt (1998), p.183, my emphasis). In Frankfurt's interpretation, Lord Fawn could not bring himself to ask and thus make himself dependent on the information that a man so inferior to himself could provide. All through the interview, however, Lord Fawn recognised that it would be best for him to ask and that he had reasons for asking, i.e. that it would be good for him to know what happened down by the rocks. Assuming that the normative judgment in this example instead was a *moral* judgment, it suggests that it is possible for a person to judge it morally right for him to A and recognise the reasons for A-ing as normative all through the experience of finding it volitionally impossible to A. Hence, I argue, counter to Miller, that also at the time of volitional impossibility, the VI-person who judges it morally right to A can have reasons to A, reasons whose normative force he appreciates.

‘Internalism with a practical rationality constraint’ is a disjunctive thesis, which means that if the argument fails to show that the person cannot be motivated, then the argument is ineffective also against the disjunctive thesis. It is worth noting, however, that if the VI-person can have a reason to A, it does not follow from Miller’s definition of practical rationality that it is not irrational to be unmotivated for the VI-person.

In conclusion, I have argued that Miller does not succeed in showing that volitional impossibility is sufficient to preclude a moral judgment from being *motivating to some extent*. Since motivation entails a normative reason on Miller’s view, but the reverse entailment does not necessarily hold, it does not follow from my reasoning that the VI-person *can* be motivated. It remains a possibility that, although the moral considerations do not cease to be reasons, the reasons could cease to give rise to motivation. This is however not something that Miller considers.

5.2.2 Is volitional impossibility incompatible with a motivating desire?

In addition to volitional impossibility precluding motivation from a moral judgment, Miller argues that ‘the desire to A’, derived from the moral judgment, cannot constitute a motivating reason and that this desire cannot motivate the agent. The argument for why the desire cannot constitute a motivating reason is the same as in 5.2.1, i.e. that Miller understands volitional impossibility as incompatible with normativity, a claim that I have attempted to argue against in 5.2.1. Miller also argues that the desire cannot be motivating *for the agent*. Volitional impossibility reveals that the agent does not identify with the desire and Miller claims that a desire that the agent does not identify with has no motivating power *for the agent*, although it may be a causally effective desire on the human being (Miller (2008a), pp.5,11, Miller (2008b), p.3). This argument thus hinges on his account of the agent. We saw earlier (end of 2.1) that the person is not an agent when he *acts on* desires that he does not identify with (Miller (2008a), pp.13,17,31). Here Miller argues that the reason why ‘the desire to A’ (that the agent does not identify with) cannot be motivating for the agent, is that the agent is defined as someone who cannot *be motivated* by a desire that he does not identify with. For his argument to be valid, it thus seems like Miller needs to change his account of the agent. Since he does not justify the modification of the account – *from* claiming that the person is not an agent when he *acts on* desires that he does not identify with, *to* claiming that the person is not an

agent when he *is motivated to act on* desires that he does not identify with – I contend that the argument against weak internalism is not convincing.

5.3 Is volitional impossibility compatible with Miller's moral judgment?

Miller's premise 1 asserts that it is possible to make the moral judgment: *It is morally right for me to perform available action A in this particular situation*, and simultaneously experience it as volitionally impossible to A. In this section, I will examine if this kind of moral judgment is incompatible with volitional impossibility. Assuming Frankfurt's account of volitional impossibility and that Frankfurt's normative judgment *It would be best for me to A* is compatible with volitional impossibility, I will conclude that Miller's moral judgment is not incompatible with volitional impossibility.

Miller does not discuss different *kinds* of moral judgments and he does not discuss his choice of moral judgment for the argument. It is clear however that he has to place the moral judgment at the time of volitional impossibility for the argument to work (Miller (2008a), pp.8–9). For the volitional impossibility to affect the motivation that the moral judgment can give rise to, the moral judgment needs to concern an available action, i.e. it needs to satisfy Vignani's circumstances requirement. Also, since volitional impossibility concerns *the person's* will, the judgment must, in line with Vignani's other requirement, link *the person* to the situation and available action (Vignani, p.219). Accordingly, Miller's agent makes a judgment about what he believes to be morally right *for him*, a judgment that satisfies also the self requirement. It is this type of moral judgment that Miller argues is not necessarily motivating.

It seems intuitively plausible that the person during the experience of the aversion – the aversion that volitional impossibility involves and that the VI-person identifies with – would not judge that it is morally good *for him* to A in the *current* situation. If the person cares about who he is to the extent that he wants to remain the person that he is, if he does not want the desire to A to be a desire that motivates his actions and if he fully endorses and identifies with the aversion to A, it seems plausible that the person would not make a judgment that satisfies both the self and the circumstances requirements (Frankfurt (1982), pp.85–6, Frankfurt (1998), pp.181–4, Frankfurt (1993), pp.20–1).

To show that Miller's moral judgment is incompatible with volitional impossibility while respecting the original account of volitional impossibility, there would have to be a significant difference between Miller's judgment

and Frankfurt's *It would be best for me to A*. Since Frankfurt claims that the agent does not change his mind between making the judgment and experiencing volitional impossibility, there would have to be a significant difference between the two judgments also when Frankfurt's judgment is made during the experience of volitional impossibility. However, both Frankfurt's and Miller's judgments satisfy the self requirement. Moreover, when Frankfurt's judgment is set at the time of volitional impossibility, the two judgments will be similar also in the sense that they both satisfy the circumstances requirement. Hence, there does not seem to be a significant difference that indicates that Miller's judgment is incompatible with volitional impossibility. I conclude that premise 1 seems not to be false.

6. ANALYSIS OF IDENTIFICATION-BASED MORAL JUDGMENTS

6.1 Overview of the analysis

In 6.2, I will proceed from Miller's proposal of the connection between moral judgments and motivation and develop it using Frankfurt's and Vignani's accounts of identification. To this end I will argue (i) that a desire for self-consistency is necessary for volitional necessity, and (ii) that a person who is in a state of volitional necessity makes the type of moral judgment that Vignani claims is necessarily motivating. In 6.3, I will argue that since this kind of moral judgment needs to be defined not only by reference to the circumstances and self requirements, but also by its source in the desire for self-consistency, it is – despite presenting a kind of moral judgment that is necessarily motivating – an externalist account. Finally, in 6.4, I will examine if this externalist account of the connection between identification-based moral judgments and motivation can meet an internalist concern.

6.2 Are any identification-based moral judgments necessarily motivating?

Let's look again at Miller's account of the connection between moral judgments and motivation. Miller proposes that motivation necessarily follows for the agent who makes a moral judgment and identifies with the norms operative in forming it. We do however not seem to get enough details about what *norm identification* consists in to be convinced that the agent is necessarily motivated. The norm identification only seems to ensure that the agent takes the normative judgment as normative (see 3.2.2).

Something that seems to guarantee motivation for the agent is a *feeling of necessity* to perform the available action, the type that Frankfurt's volitional necessity can provide. The reason that the person experiences volitional impossibility is that she attempts to defy the limits of her will, which on Frankfurt's account implies that she attempts to defy the limits of her self (Frankfurt (1998), pp.187–8). For the attempt to defy the limits of her self to be aversive, however, it seems to me like something more is needed. For the attempt to defy the limits of the self to be aversive, the person in question needs to possess a desire for self-consistency. Here, the identification model that Vigani uses is relevant. I would like to argue that the self is at stake in a similar manner in Vigani's judgments of responsibility and in Frankfurt's volitional necessity. The desire for self-consistency, which in Frankfurt's model would be the same as a desire for will-consistency, is needed, I contend, to explain that 'defying the limits of the will' is aversive, which means it is needed to explain volitional impossibility. The fact that the self is at stake is what gives rise both to the feeling of necessity, the aversion associated with attempting to go against the necessity, and the liberating feeling associated with giving in to the necessity. Thus, Vigani's model is needed to make sense of Frankfurt's. Conversely, Frankfurt's model of how a person forms her will and is constrained by how she has formed it, casts light on the way in which 'the sense of self being at stake' in Vigani's model gives rise to a judgment that a certain action is necessary *for her* to perform.

What I propose is that the autonomous choice of objective moral identity content – which can be viewed as formation and structuring of second-order volitions – forms the person's will, which constitutes her subjective identity. This subjective identity involves a desire for self-consistency. When the person is in a situation where an available action feels necessary for her to perform in order to preserve her subjective identity, she is in a state of volitional necessity. She will, in this state, make the type of necessarily motivating moral judgment that Vigani labels judgment of responsibility, i.e. the judgment: *It is necessary for me to perform available action A that I judge to be morally right* (Vigani, pp.212–3, 216,219). The necessity at play in this judgment is a feeling of necessity that resides in identification. It is worth noting that my claim that 'the person who makes a judgment of responsibility in a state of volitional necessity is necessarily motivated' does not entail that the person cannot have subjectively normative reasons to perform actions that are incompatible with her identity. Hence, the current account does not counter the reasoning in 5.2.1.

Taking identification involving a desire for self-consistency as the source either of these judgments or of their motivational force seems to be something that is compatible not only with Vigani's, but also with Frankfurt's and possibly Miller's views. Frankfurt takes identification as the source of the feeling of necessity. On Frankfurt's view, caring and identifying involves a commitment that is made by formation of compatible second-order volitions. These are formed in order to protect what the person cares about and thus to protect the will and the self (Frankfurt (1982), pp.87–8, Frankfurt (1993), p.21). Hence, Frankfurt's identification could be interpreted as involving a desire for self-consistency, and, as I have argued above, such a desire seems necessary to explain the aversion associated with volitional impossibility. Miller views identification with norms as the source of moral judgments that are necessarily motivating. Since identification with norms involves a commitment, as well as identification with desires and normative beliefs that the norm licences, Miller's view on identification may be compatible with a desire for maintaining identification with the norms that the person adheres to, i.e. a desire for self-consistency (Miller (2008a), pp.16,31, Miller (2008b), p.34, Miller (2007a), p.20).

I have argued that the kind of judgment that is necessarily motivating has its source in a desire for self-consistency, and, as we have seen earlier, it satisfies the circumstances and self requirements. However, these two requirements do not seem to be sufficient constraints on the kind of judgment that is necessarily motivating. The self requirement needs to be further specified in order for the necessity to reside in the desire for self-consistency. Miller's judgment *It is morally right for me to perform available action A* resembles the judgment of responsibility *It is necessary for me to perform available action A that I judge to be morally right* to the extent that both satisfy the circumstances and the self requirements. There is a difference, however, in the way in which the judgment ties the self to the available action. In Vigani's judgment it is the necessity of performing the available action that is tied to the self. In Miller's judgment it is the normative desirability of the available action that is tied to the self. Only the former type of self requirement seems to reside in the desire for self-consistency. The judgment that an action is *good for the self* to perform does not seem to be a judgment that is necessarily connected to a desire to remain self-consistent. This is compatible with Miller's view since he argues that the type of judgment that he uses can be made in absence of identification. It is, I contend, a judgment that satisfies the type of self requirement that links the

self to the necessity of performing the available action that is made in the state of volitional necessity, and it is this kind of judgment that is necessarily motivating. Vigani's judgment has, as we have seen, two parts: the judgment that *the available action is necessary for me to perform* and the judgment that *the available action is right* (Hardy&Carlo, p.235, Vigani, pp.219,223). The former judgment resides in the subjective identity content (including the desire for self-consistency), and the latter in the objective identity content. Hence, the link to the self in the judgment I am trying to define needs to reside in the subjective identity content, which is not the case for Miller's judgment.

6.3 Do these identification-based moral judgments support internalism?

Do these constraints on the kind of moral judgment that I, with Vigani, claim to be necessarily motivating give any clues as to whether the proposed account is internalist or externalist? The internalism-related question here is not whether moral judgments in general are necessarily motivating, but whether this *kind* of moral judgment is necessarily motivating. Both Miller and Vigani refrain from taking a position on whether their accounts of the relationship between moral judgments and motivation are internalist or externalist (Miller (2008a), p.32, Vigani, p.226). Vigani doubts however that an externalist would be willing to say that any kind of moral judgment is necessarily motivating, indicating that she leans towards it being an internalist account (Vigani, p.226).

Vigani does not discuss whether the desire for self-consistency is necessarily linked to the judgment of responsibility. It seems to me, however, that this is the question that needs to be answered in order to be able to determine if the account should be classified as weak internalism or externalism. Weak internalism allows for a desire that is necessarily linked to the moral judgment to be the source of motivation. I have already argued that the desire for self-consistency is a necessary source of motivation for the type of judgment at hand, thus showing that there is a necessary link such that the judgment is only a judgment of responsibility if it derives from the desire for self-consistency. However, this necessary link is between the desire for self-consistency and *one part* of the judgment of responsibility, i.e. the judgment that it is necessary for the person to perform the available action. There is no necessary link between the desire for self-consistency and the *other part* of the judgment, the part about the normative desirability of the available action. For the account to be classified as weak internalism there would, I contend,

have to be a necessary link between the desire that gives rise to motivation, on the one hand, and the judgment about a certain action being morally right, on the other, which there is not. Therefore, although the described kind of identification-based moral judgment is necessarily motivating, the account is externalist. It is only by defining this particular kind of moral judgment (with two parts) as having a necessary source in the desire for self-consistency, and thus making this desire intrinsic to what the moral judgment is, that it can be claimed that it is necessarily and intrinsically motivating.

This shows that necessarily motivating identification-based moral judgments do not support internalism. Vigani has, successfully I think, argued that the thesis that ‘all moral judgments are necessarily motivating’, can be rejected, since the moral judgment needs to satisfy at least the circumstances and the self requirements. The other internalism-relevant question is if *any kind* of moral judgment can be necessarily motivating in the sense that internalism prescribes, i.e. without the need for a desire that is independent of the normative content of the moral judgment. I have argued that necessarily motivating identification-based moral judgments do not support internalism. To show that internalism is false, however, one would also have to show that there is no *other kind* of *not identification-based* moral judgment that is necessarily motivating in the sense that internalism prescribes.

6.4 Does the identification-based account meet internalist concerns?

The externalist needs to explain the apparently reliable connection between moral judgments and motivation. Identification is one way to explain this connection. For Miller, the good person always identifies with the moral norms operative in forming moral judgments and is therefore necessarily motivated by her moral judgments (Miller (2008a), pp.28,30). Vigani argues that most people identify with some moral values, although the situations in which people experience a feeling of necessity to protect their identity will differ between persons depending on their objective identity content. This is according to her the reason for our internalist intuition. She also suggests that identification is needed to explain the motivation of moral exemplars, i.e. persons with extraordinary moral commitment, who report moral traits as more central to their identity and experience their moral actions as effortless (Vigani, p.217).

Svavarsdóttir offers another externalist response whereby only a person who has a *standing desire to be moral* – a desire that establishes a link

between the moral judgment and a motivating desire – is necessarily motivated by her moral judgments (Svavarsdóttir, pp.195,201). The person who has the standing desire to be moral will, from the moral judgment that *it is right to A*, form *the desire to A* and therefore be motivated. The good person has this standing desire. The amoralist lacks it.

Svavarsdóttir's account has been charged with giving a faulty account of the motivational dispositions of the good person, which illustrates the internalist concern that allowing for a judgment-independent desire as source of motivation risks corrupting morality. A good person, internalists argue, care non-derivatively about other-regarding values like, say, honesty. She does not act honestly in order to satisfy her desire to be moral; she does not act honestly as *a means* to do what is moral (Rosati, par.3.2, Svavarsdóttir, p.205).

Like Svavarsdóttir's account, the identification-based account of moral motivation could, since it involves a desire for self-consistency, be charged with corrupting the nature of morality. As a response, it has been argued that the desire for self-consistency is a desire to remain committed to one's moral values, and that the moral identity that the agent desires to preserve has its source in caring about morality (Hardy&Carlo, p.237). This response is however equally applicable to Svavarsdóttir's account of a standing desire to be moral, which obviously could derive from other-regarding desires and caring about morality. Hence, this response does not seem to put the identification-based approach in a better position to meet the internalist concern.

One could argue that the identification-based account involves both objective and subjective identity content, and that the notion of the objective identity content deriving its motivational force from the subjective content preserves the integrity of the objective identity content. However, also Svavarsdóttir's account has these two parts since the standing desire to be moral is independent of the moral judgment, the motivational force of which it elicits. Hence, it does not seem like the proposed externalist identification-based account of the connection between moral judgments and motivation can meet this internalist concern.

7. CONCLUSION

In this paper, I have examined the role identification plays for moral motivation. I have argued that identification-based volitional impossibility to perform a certain moral action does not preclude the agent from having

motivating reasons to act on a moral judgment that is incompatible with her identification, thus indicating that the identification-based account cannot show that internalism is false. I have also argued that, although identification-based moral judgments can be necessarily motivating, this does not support internalism since the motivational force that is provided by identification resides in a desire for self-consistency, a desire that is not necessarily linked to the normative aspect of the judgment. This indicates that the identification-based account cannot show that internalism is true. I conclude that, if all kinds of moral judgments that are necessarily motivating are grounded in identification, then internalism is false.

Acknowledgments

I would like to thank the referees for valuable and constructive comments that significantly improved the quality of the paper.

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